Many system components and network applications are written in languages that are prone to memory corruption vulnerabilities. There have been countless cases where simple mistakes by developers resulted in memory corruption vulnerabilities and consequently security exploits. While there have been tremendous research efforts to mitigate these vulnerabilities, useafter-free still remains one of the most critical and popular attack vectors because existing proposals have not adequately addressed the challenging program analysis and runtime performance issues.
Abstract-Many system components and network applications are written in languages that are prone to memory corruption vulnerabilities. There have been countless cases where simple mistakes by developers resulted in memory corruption vulnerabilities and consequently security exploits. While there have been tremendous research efforts to mitigate these vulnerabilities, useafter-free still remains one of the most critical and popular attack vectors because existing proposals have not adequately addressed the challenging program analysis and runtime performance issues.
In this paper we present DANGNULL, a system that detects temporal memory safety violations-in particular, use-after-free and double-free-during runtime. DANGNULL relies on the key observation that the root cause of these violations is that pointers are not nullified after the target object is freed. Based on this observation, DANGNULL automatically traces the object's relationships via pointers and automatically nullifies all pointers when the target object is freed. DANGNULL offers several benefits. First, DANGNULL addresses the root cause of temporal memory safety violations. It does not rely on the side effects of violations, which can vary and may be masked by attacks. Thus, DANGNULL is effective against even the most sophisticated exploitation techniques. Second, DANGNULL checks object relationship information using runtime object range analysis on pointers, and thus is able to keep track of pointer semantics more robustly even in complex and large scale software. Lastly, DANGNULL does not require numerous explicit sanity checks on memory accesses because it can detect a violation with implicit exception handling, and thus its detection capabilities only incur moderate performance overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many system components and network applications are written in the unsafe C/C++ languages that are prone to memory corruption vulnerabilities. To address this problem, a large number of techniques have been developed to improve memory safety and prevent memory corruption bugs from being exploited [2, 4, 12, 19, 30-33, 38, 48] . However, the problem of detecting and preventing use-after-free bugs remains unsolved. Among the CVE identifiers of the Chromium browser that we collected from Oct. 2011 to Oct. 2013 in Table I , use-afterfree vulnerabilities are not only 40x/3x more than stack and heap overflows in quantity, but also have more severe security impacts than traditional vulnerabilities: 88% of use-after-free bugs are rated critical or high in severity, while only 51% of heap overflows are considered as high severity. Not only are there many use-after-free vulnerabilities, they have also become a significant attack vector. In Pwn2Own 2014 [21] , an annual contest among hackers and security research groups, the VUPEN team was awarded with the largest cash amount, $100,000, for a single use-after-free exploit that affects all major WebKit-based browsers.
Compared with many other vulnerability types, including stack buffer overflows or heap buffer overflows, use-after-free is generally known as one of the most difficult vulnerability type to identify using static analysis. In modern C/C++ applications (especially under object-oriented or event-driven designs), the resource free (i.e., memory deallocation) and use (i.e., memory dereference) are well separated and heavily complicated. Statically identifying use-after-free vulnerabilities under this difficult conditions involves solving challenging static analysis problems (e.g., inter-procedural and point-to analysis while also considering multi-threading effects), and is therefore feasible only for small size programs [13, 34] .
Memory error detectors
AddressSanitizer [38] Yes No Low Yes Heap manipulation Memcheck [32] Yes No High No N/A Purify [19] Yes No High No N/A Control Flow Integrity CCFIR [50] Yes No Low Yes Abusing coarse grained CFI bin-CFI [51] Yes No Low Yes or SafeDispatch [22] Yes No Low Yes corrupting non-function pointers Safe memory allocators Cling [2] No No Low Yes Heap manipulation DieHarder [33] No No Low Yes Heap manipulation Most research efforts to detect use-after-free vulnerabilities are relying on either additional runtime checks or dynamic analysis (listed in Table II ). For instance, use-after-free detectors including [30, 48] have been proposed to address dangling pointer issues. By maintaining metadata for each pointer and tracking precise pointer semantics (i.e., which pointer points to which memory region), these tools can identify dangling pointers or prevent memory accesses through dangling pointers. However, precisely tracking runtime semantics on a per-pointer bases is non-trivial as there would be a huge number of pointers and their metadata in runtime, which may result in high false positive rates (i.e., identifying benign program behavior as use-after-free) or significant performance degradation. Such shortcomings would limit the potential for these techniques to be deployed for large scale software.
Memory error detectors [19, 32, 38] are also able to capture use-after-free bugs during the software testing phase. By maintaining the allocated/freed status of memory, these tools can prevent accesses to freed memory. However, these tools are not suitable for detecting real-world exploits against use-after-free vulnerabilities if attackers can partially control the heap memory allocation process, especially for web browsers. For example, by using Heap Spraying [10, 36] or Heap Fengshui [39] like techniques, attackers can force the target program to reuse certain freed memory.
In addition, Control Flow Integrity (CFI) tools can be used to prevent use-after-free vulnerabilities from being exploited to hijack the control-flow because the majority of vulnerability exploitations hijack the control flow to execute malicious code with Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) [35] . However, due to the inherent limitations of these tools, most of them only enforce coarse-grained CFI, which leaves some control-flows exploitable [7, 11, 15, 16] . Moreover, since control-flow hijacks are not the only method to compromise a program, it is still possible to bypass these techniques even if they can enforce perfect CFI, e.g., via non-control data attacks [8, 27] .
Overall, all of the previous protection techniques show either high false positive rates or are bypassable using certain exploitation techniques. In other words, there is currently no use-after-free mitigation solution that works well for large scale software and can also stop all known forms of use-after-free exploitation techniques.
In this paper, we present DANGNULL, a system that prevents temporal memory safety violations (i.e., use-afterfree and double-free) at runtime. As suggested by many secure programming books [37] , a pointer should be set to NULL after the target object is freed. Motivated by the fact that dangling pointers obviously violate this rule, DANGNULL automatically traces the object relationships and nullifies their pointers when the object they pointed to is freed. In particular, rather than relying on a heavy dynamic taint analysis, DANGNULL incorporates a runtime object range analysis on pointers to efficiently keep track of both pointer semantics and object relationships. Based on the collected object relationship information, DANGNULL nullifies dangling pointers when the target memory is freed. After this nullification, any temporal memory safety violation (i.e., dereferencing the dangling pointers) turns into a nulldereference that can be safely contained.
This unique design choice of DANGNULL offers several benefits. First, since nullification immediately eliminates any possible negative security impacts at the moment dangling pointers are created, DANGNULL does not rely on the side effects from use-after-free or double-free, and thus cannot be bypassed by sophisticated exploit techniques. Second, a runtime object range analysis on pointers allows DANGNULL to efficiently keep track of pointer semantics. Instead of tracing complicated full pointer semantics, DANGNULL only tracks 1 for function in Program: Algorithm 1: The algorithm for static instrumentation. For every store instruction where the destination may stay on the heap, DANGNULL inserts trace() to keep track of the relation between the pointer and the object it points to.
On every memory allocation, DANGNULL initializes a shadow object for the target object being created. Upon freeing an object, DANGNULL retrieves all pointers that point to this object (from shadowObjTree) and nullifies those pointers, to prevent potential use-after-free or double-free.
Later in this section, we describe each component of DANGNULL (the static instrumentation and the runtime library), and explain how we maintain shadowObjTree with a concrete running example (Example 1).
B. Static Instrumentation
The static instrumentation of DANGNULL is done at the LLVM IR [24] level and is designed to achieve one primary goal: to monitor pointer assignments to maintain the point-to relations. To balance security, performance, and engineering efforts, only appropriate pointers are instrumented. More specifically, DANGNULL only tracks pointers located on the heap (e.g., doc→child in Example 1) but not on the stack (e.g., doc in Example 1). From our preliminary experiment on the Chromium browser, we found that stack-located pointers are unlikely to be exploitable, even though are many dangling pointers. This is because stack-located pointers tend to have a very short lifetime since the scope of stack variables are bounded by the scope of a function and accesses to those variables are limited in the programming language. Heaplocated pointers generally have much a longer lifetime (i.e., the number of instructions between free and use is larger). In other words, unsafe dangling pointers located in the heap offer better controls between the free and dereference operations, and are thus are more likely to be exploited ( §II). Therefore, to reduce performance overhead and keep our engineering efforts effective and moderate, we focus on heap-located pointers. Note that the nullification idea of DANGNULL has no dependencies on the pointer locations, and is generally applicable to both heap-and stack-located pointers.
The algorithm for the static instrumentation is described in Algorithm 1. At lines 1-4, all store instructions 1 in each function are iterated. With the pointer information obtained at lines 5-6, DANGNULL first opts out if lhs is a stack variable, using a intra-procedure backward data-flow analysis (line 9-10). Specifically, given a lhs variable, we leveraged a def-use 1 In the LLVM IR, store instructions are always in the form of lhs := rhs. chain provided by LLVM to see if this variable is allocated on the stack via the allocation statement. Since this analysis is conservative, it is possible that DANGNULL still instruments some pointer assignments in the stack. However, as DANGNULL does not instrument allocations and deallocations of stack variables, such assignments will be ignored by the runtime library. Next, DANGNULL performs a simple type signature check to see if rhs is not of a pointer type (line 11-12) 2 . With these two opt-out checks, DANGNULL ignores all uninteresting cases as the current version of DANGNULL only targets the heap located pointers. Because the location of a heap pointer cannot always be statically known due to pointer aliasing issues, store instructions are conservatively instrumented unless it is soundly determined to be a stack-located pointer. Any possible over-instrumentation due to this conservative choice will be handled using the runtime object range analysis, which we will describe in the next subsection ( §III-C).
Once all these sanity checks are passed, a trace() function call is inserted after the store instruction. For example, to instrument doc->child = body in Example 1, DANGNULL inserts trace(&doc->child, body) after its assignment instruction. In this way, the DANGNULL's runtime library can later correctly trace the pointer references originating from doc->child.
Note that DANGNULL relies on the type signature of C/C++. Coercing type signatures in the code might cause some false negatives, meaning that DANGNULL can miss some propagation of pointers at runtime. In particular, if developers convert types of pointer objects (by casting) into a value of nonpointer types, then DANGNULL will not be able to trace the pointer propagation via that value. Moreover, if some libraries are not built using DANGNULL (e.g., proprietary libraries), DANGNULL would still be able to run them together, but the protection domain will be limited only to the instrumented code or modules.
C. Runtime Library
The runtime library of DANGNULL maintains all the object relationship information with an efficient variant of a redblack tree, called shadowObjTree. Object layout information (i.e., address ranges of an object) is populated by interposing all memory allocation and deallocation functions (e.g., malloc and free, new and delete, etc). Object relationships (i.e., an object refers to another object) are captured with the help of trace() added during the static instrumentation. Based on the collected object relationship information, the runtime library automatically nullifies all dangling pointers when the target memory is freed.
In this subsection, we first describe shadowObjTree, a data structure designed for maintaining the complex object relationships ( §III-C1). We then further describe how these data structures are populated and how dangling pointers are immediately nullified during runtime ( §III-C2). Figure 2 : The shadow object tree and three shadow objects (doc, body, and div) corresponding to Example 1. To simplify the representation, only in-and out-bound pointers of the body shadow object are shown. body keeps the in-bound pointer for doc→child, which points to the shadow object of doc, and the out-bound pointer for body->child, which points to the shadow object of div.
1) Shadow Object
is hierarchical: each running process has multiple objects, and each object has multiple in/out-bound pointers. Thus, shadowObjTree is composed of several sub-data structures as nodes, to better represent this hierarchical structure. Figure 2 shows a structural view of shadowObjTree. A node of shadowObjTree is a shadow object, which holds the object's memory layout information (i.e., the object boundary with base and end addresses) and in/out-bound pointers (i.e., directed references between objects). To find a shadow object for the given pointer p, shadowObjTree searches for a shadow object such that the corresponding object's base ≤ p < end. In other words, as long as the pointer p points to a corresponding object's address range, shadowObjTree returns the shadow object.
To efficiently support operations like insert, remove, and search, shadowObjTree uses a variant of the red-black tree as the underlying data structure, which generally excels if 1) the insertion order of keys shows random patterns and 2) the number of search operations is significantly more than that of insertion and remove operations. In shadowObjTree, the key is the address of the object, and the order of allocated objects' addresses eventually depends on the mmap() system call, which shows random behavior in modern ASLR enabled systems. Moreover, DANGNULL requires significantly more find() operations than allocObj() and freeObj() operations to soundly trace the object relationships.
Note that a hash table would not be an appropriate data structure for shadowObjTree because it cannot efficiently handle the size information of an object. To be specific, a find operation of shadowObjTree must answer range-based queries (i.e., finding a corresponding shadow object given the address, where the address can point to the middle of a shadow object), but a hash function of a hash table cannot be efficiently designed to incorporate such range information.
In addition, shadowObjTree has two sub-trees to maintain in/out-bound pointer information, and each sub-tree uses a redblack tree as the underlying data structure for the same reason described for shadowObjTree. As the pointer reference is directed, an in-bound reference of the object denotes that the object is pointed to by some other object and an out-bound reference denotes that it points to some other object. For example, the body object in Example 1 has doc→child as an in-bound sub-tree and div as an out-bound sub-tree.
2) Runtime Operations and Nullification: Upon running the instrumented binary, the runtime library of DANGNULL interposes all memory allocations and deallocations, and redirects their invocations to allocObj() and freeObj(). In addition, trace() instructions were inserted at pointer propagation instructions from the static instrumentation. As a running example, Example 2 illustrates how DANGNULL interposes and instruments the example code in Example 1 where + marked lines show the interposed or instrumented code.
The algorithm for the runtime library, which populates shadowObjTree, is described in Algorithm 2. Upon the memory allocation invocation, allocObj() first invokes corresponding real allocation functions (line 2). With the base pointer address from the real allocation, a shadow object is created and inserted to shadowObjTree as a node (lines 3-4). When trace() is invoked, the object relationship is added to the shadow objects. It first fetches two shadow objects representing lhs and rhs pointers, respectively (line 9-10). Next, with the concrete runtime values on pointers, DANGNULL uses the object range analysis to check whether lhs and rhs truly point to live heap objects (line 13). It is worth noting that this object range analysis not only helps DANGNULL avoid tracing any incorrect or unnecessary pointer semantics that are not related to dangling pointer issues, but also makes DANGNULL more robust on object relationship tracings, since it is based on concrete values and reasons about the correctness of pointer semantics with the liveness of source and destination heap objects. If the check passes, DANGNULL first removes an existing relationship, if there is any (line 14). It then inserts the shadow pointer to both shadow objects (line [16] [17] .
Note, by using shadowObjTree, DANGNULL does not need to handle pointer arithmetic to trace pointers. Specifically, because shadowObjTree contains information (base and size) of all live heap objects, given any pointer p, DANGNULL can locate the corresponding object through a search query (shadowObjTree.find()), i.e., finding object that has its base ≤ q < (base + size). For the same reason, although DANGNULL does not trace non-heap-located pointers (i.e., pointers in the stack or global variables), DANGNULL can still trace correctly when the pointer value is copied through them and brought back to the heap.
When an object is freed with freeObj(), the actual nullification starts. DANGNULL first fetches its shadow object (line 21). Next, it iterates over all in-bound pointers (pointing to the current object to be freed), and nullifies them with a pre-defined value (NULLIFY_VALUE at line 27). Note that these in-bound pointers are the pointers that would become dangling otherwise, and the pre-defined value can be set as any relatively small non-negative integer value (e.g., 0, 1, 2, ...). To avoid the erroneous nullification due to later deallocation of objects that the current object points to, DANGNULL also removes the current object from the sub-tree of the out-bound pointers (lines [29] [30] [31] .
It is worth noting that DANGNULL nullifies not only unsafe dangling pointers, but also benign dangling pointers. In spite of this extra nullification, DANGNULL can still retain the same program behavior semantics because benign dangling pointers should not have any pointer semantics (i.e., never be used). 1 // (a) memory allocations 2 + Document *doc = allocObj(Document); 3 + Body *body = allocObj(Body); 4 + Div *div = allocObj(Div); 5 6 // (b) using memory: propagating pointers 7 doc->child = body; 8 + trace(&doc->child, body); 9 10 body->child = div; 11 + trace(&body->child, div); 12 13 // (c) memory free: unsafe dangling pointer, doc->child, 14 // is automatically nullified 15 + freeObj(body); 16 17 // (d) use-aftre-free is prevented, avoid dereferencing it 18 if (doc->child) 19 doc->child->getAlign(); Example 2: Instrumented running example of Example 1 (actual instrumentation proceeds at the LLVM Bitcode level). Memory allocations (new) and deallocations (free) are replaced with allocObj() and freeObj(), and trace() is placed on every memory assignment, according to the static instrumentation algorithm (Algorithm 1).
In most cases as we quantified in §V, DANGNULL behaves correctly without false positives. We have found one rare false positive case, described in detail in §VI.
In our secured binary (Example 2), doc→child is automatically nullified when body is freed: the shadow object representing body was created (line 3), propagated to doc→child (line 8), and nullified when the body is deallocated (line 15). As a result, depending on NULLIFY_VALUE, the example would raise the SIGSEGV exception (if NULLIFY_VALUE > 0) or continuously run (if NULLIFY_VALUE == 0), both of which safely mitigates negative security impacts by unsafe dangling pointers.
For the SIGSEGV exception cases, DANGNULL guarantees that the program securely ends in a safe-dereference, which is defined as follows.
Definition 4. Safe-dereference. If a dereference instruction accesses the memory address in the range of [0, N] where it is preoccupied as non-readable and non-writable memory pages for a given constant N, such a dereference is a safe-dereference.
A safe-dereference guarantees that a dereference on nullified unsafe dangling pointers turns into a secured crash handled either by the operating system or DANGNULL's SIGSEGV exception handler. In modern operating systems, it is common that the first several virtual memory pages are protected to avoid any potential null-dereference attacks (e.g., virtual address spaces from 0 to 64K are protected in Ubuntu [46] ). In other words, DANGNULL can utilize this existing null address padding to guarantee safe-dereferences (64K in Ubuntu). Even if this null address padding is not supported by the operating system, DANGNULL can still pre-allocate these spaces using the mmap() system call to be non-readable and non-writable before any other code runs.
For continuously running cases, DANGNULL utilized the existing sanity check at line 18. This is because the semantic on invalid pointers is identical to both DANGNULL's nullification and typical programming practices. In other words, because it is common for developers to check whether the pointer value is null before accessing it, DANGNULL's nullification can utilize 1 def allocObj(size): dstShadowObj.removeInboundPtr(ptr) 32 33 shadowObjTree.remove(shadowObj) 34 35 return real_free(ptr) Algorithm 2: The Runtime library algorithm. All error handling and synchronization code is omitted for clarity. DANGNULL has a global data structure (thread-safe), shadowObjTree, to maintain object relations with shadow objects. allocObj() and freeObj() replaced the malloc() and free() (and their equivalence, new and delete in C++), and trace() will be inserted on every memory assignments as a result of the static instrumentation ( §III-B).
such existing checks and keep the application running as if there were no unsafe dangling pointers.
This example is oversimplified for the purpose of clarifying the problem scope and showing how DANGNULL can nullify dangling pointers. In §V-A, we show that DANGNULL is effective when applied to real, complex use-after-free bugs in Chromium.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented DANGNULL based on the LLVM Compiler project [43] . The static instrumentation module is implemented as an extra LLVM pass, and the runtime library is implemented based on LLVM compiler-rt with the LLVM Sanitizer code base. Table III shows the lines of code to implement DANGNULL, excluding empty lines and comments.
We placed the initialization function into .preinit_array as a ELF file format so that the initialization of DANGNULL is done before any other function 4 . In this function, all standard allocation and deallocation functions (e.g., malloc and free, new and delete, etc) are interposed. In total, DANGNULL interposed 18 different allocation functions in the current implementation, and any additional customized allocators for the target application can be easily added with one line of its function signature.
To avoid multi-threading issues when running DANGNULL, we used mutex locks for any data structures with the potential for data racing. One global mutex lock is used for shadowObjTree, and all shadow objects and their in/out-bound pointer sub-trees also hold their own mutex locks.
To retain the target program's original memory layout, DANGNULL uses a dedicated allocator from Sanitizer that has dedicated memory pages. All memory for metadata, including shadowObjTree and its pointer sub-trees, is allocated from this allocator. Thus, DANGNULL does not interfere with the original memory layout, and it can avoid any potential side effects by manipulating the original allocators [14] .
We also modified the front-end of LLVM so that users of DANGNULL can easily build and secure their target applications with one extra compilation option and linker option. To build SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks, we added one line to the build configuration file. To build the Chromium browser, we added 21 lines to the .gyp build configuration files.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluated DANGNULL on two program sets, the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks [40] and the Chromium browser [41] 5 . First, we tested how accurately DANGNULL mitigates known use-after-free exploits ( §V-A). Next, we measured how much overhead DANGNULL imposes during the instrumentation phase ( §V-B) and the runtime phase ( §V-C). Finally, we conducted a stress test to see if DANGNULL runs well without breaking compatibility ( §V-D). All experiments were conducted on an Ubuntu 13.10 system (Linux Kernel 3.11.0) with a quadcore 3.40 GHz CPU (Intel Xeon E3-1245), 16 GB RAM, and 1 TB SSD-based storage.
A. Attack Mitigation
The goal of DANGNULL is to turn use-after-free or doublefree attempts into safe-dereferences by nullifying dangling pointers. In order to test how DANGNULL accurately nullified unsafe dangling pointers and eventually protected the system from temporal memory safety violations, we tested the DANGNULL-hardened Chromium browser with real-world useafter-free exploits. Given the Chromium version instrumented 5 The Chromium browser is the open source project behind the Chrome browser, and these two are largely identical.
(29.0.1457.65), we first collected all publicly available use-afterfree exploits from the Chromium bug tracking system [42] , which opens vulnerability information to the public after mitigation and includes a proof of concept exploit 6 . Table IV lists seven use-after-free vulnerabilities that existed in the targeted Chromium version. All of these were marked as high severity vulnerabilities by the Chromium team, which suggests that these have a high potential to be used for arbitrary code execution. Bug ID 162835 was specifically selected to later demonstrate that DANGNULL can mitigate this sophisticated exploit technique.
Before applying DANGNULL, all proofs-of-concept can trigger SIGSEGV exceptions at invalid addresses (No-Nullify column in Table IV ). These invalid addresses are memory addresses that are dereferenced, i.e., the values of unsafe dangling pointers. Although we only present one value for each vulnerability, this value would randomly change between different executions due to ASLR and the order of memory allocations. These seemingly random SIGSEGV exceptions can be abused to launch control-flow hijacking attacks, information leaks, etc. They are particularly dangerous if the vulnerability offers a control between free and use (the right-most column, Control b/w free and use). For example, with this control, malicious JavaScript code can place crafted data in freed memory and turn the SIGSEGV exception (i.e., deference the unsafe dangling pointer) into control-flow hijacking attacks or information leakages depending on the context of dereference operations. Moreover, this control between free and use also implies that the attackers can bypass memory error detection tools (e.g., AddressSanitizer [38] ) because it allows the attackers to force the reuse of a freed memory region (see more details in §VII and a concrete bypassing case (Example 5)).
Once Chromium is instrumented with DANGNULL, all of these cases were safely mitigated (Nullify-value column). Depending on the nullify value provided as a parameter, all 28 cases (7 rows by 4 columns) result in the following three categories: 1) integer values represent that DANGNULL securely contained SIGSEGV exceptions with safe-dereference; 2) stopped by assertion represents that DANGNULL re-utilized existing safe assertions in Chromium; and 3) check marks (✓) represent that Chromium continuously runs as if Chromium is already patched.
For the safe-dereference cases, it is worth noting that the dereferenced address values are quite small (at most 0x2e8). Although these seven exploits would not be enough to represent all use-after-free behaviors, we believe this implies that the moderate size of null address padding for safe-dereference ( §III-C2) would be effective enough. DANGNULL's null address padding can be easily extended without actual physical memory overheads if necessary, and 64-bit x86 architectures can allow even more aggressive pre-mappings. Moreover, unlike the case before applying DANGNULL, these dereferenced addresses did not change between different executions. This indicates that unsafe dangling pointers were successfully nullified using 0x7f27000001a8 0x2e8 0x21 0x22 0x23 yes  265838  2013-2909  High  0x1bfc9901ece1  ✓  0x1  0x2  0x3 yes  279277  2013-2909  High  0x7f2f57260968  ✓  0x1  0x2  0x3 yes  282088  2013-2918  High  0x490341400000  0xf0  0xf0 0xf0 0xf0 difficult  286975  2013-2922  High  0x60b000006da4  ✓ 0x15 0x16 0x17 yes  295010  2013-6625  High  0x897ccce6951  0x30  0x1  0x2  0x3 yes  162835 2012-5137 High 0x612000046c18 stopped by assertion yes Table IV : DANGNULL safely nullified all seven real-world use-after-free exploits for Chromium. Among these seven cases, three correctly run even after use-after-free exploits as if it was patched (represented as a ✓), and one is safely prevented as DANGNULL re-utilized existing assertions in Chromium (represented as stopped by assertion). Without DANGNULL, all exploits are potential threats, leading to control-flow hijacking attacks, information leakages, etc. To be concrete, we also include invalid pointers causing an exception with various nullification values (0-3), and their threat in terms of the chances of an attacker's control between free and use. Table V : Details of instrumented binaries (the left half) and their runtime properties (the right half) in SPEC CPU2006. The left half describes the details of incremented file size due to newly inserted instrumentation instructions. The runtime library of DANGNULL is about 370 KB; DANGNULL requires approximately 40 B per instrumentation to trace pointer propagation. The right half represents the details of the programs' runtime behavior (e.g., increase of memory usage and the number of pointers and objects in each benchmark). The increase of memory (due to shadowObjTree) depends on the number of objects and pointers created and freed in total; bzip2, which has minimal memory allocation, imposed no extra memory overhead, while gcc, which has many memory operations, imposes about 80 MB of extra memory overhead with DANGNULL. 
C. Runtime Overheads
As DANGNULL must trace object relationships for nullification, it increases both execution time and memory usage. To determine how much runtime overhead DANGNULL imposes on target applications, we measured various runtime overheads of SPEC CPU2006 and the Chromium browser. Figure 3 shows the runtime performance overheads of DANGNULL running SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. The over-heads largely depend on the number of objects and pointers that DANGNULL traced and stored in shadowObjTree. These metadata tracing measurements are shown in the right half of Table V. As we described in §V-B, each application has a different number of object allocations and degree of pointer propagation. Accordingly, each object allocation and pointer propagation would insert extra metadata into shadowObjTree unless it fails runtime range analysis. DANGNULL imposed an average performance overhead of 80%. DANGNULL caused more runtime overhead if the application had to trace a large number of pointers. For example, in the povray case, a total of 7,923,000 pointers were traced because it maintains a large number of pointers to render image pixels, and thus increased execution time by 270% with 213% memory overhead. On the other hand, in h264ref, only 906 pointers were traced and resulted in a 1% increase in execution time and 472% memory overhead. exploits carefully developed for complex and large scale software (e.g., Chromium).
• Runtime use-after-free mitigation for end users: if performance overhead is not the primary concern of end users, DANGNULL is an effective use-after-free mitigation tool with moderate performance overhead, especially for web browsers.
• Use-after-free resilient programs: we have shown that DANGNULL can utilize existing sanity check routines and survive use-after-free attempts. By integrating automatic runtime repair work [25] , we believe DANGNULL can evolve to support use-afterfree resilient programs in the future.
Performance optimization. We believe DANGNULL's performance overhead can be further improved, especially for performance critical applications. First of all, instrumentation phases can be further optimized by leveraging more sophisticated static analysis. For example, if it is certain that the original code already nullifies a pointer, DANGNULL would not need to nullify it again. Although we have not heavily explored this direction, this has to be done carefully because soundly learning this information involves pointer-aliasing problems, which are well-known difficult problems in program analyses, and any incorrect analysis results would lead to both false positives and false negatives.
Moreover, we identified that manipulation of shadowObjTree is the main performance bottleneck, and this can be optimized by 1) leveraging transactional memory [20] to enhance locking performance on shadowObjTree; 2) designing a software cache for shadowObjTree; 3) using alternative data-structures to implement shadowObjTree (e.g., alignment-based metadata storage by replacing the memory allocator [18] ); or 4) creating a dedicated analyzing thread or process for shadowObjTree [23] .
False negatives. DANGNULL's static instrumentation assumes that a pointer is propagated only if either the leftor right-hand side of a variable is a pointer type. This would not be true if the program is written in a manner such that the propagation is done between non-pointer-typed variables. Consider the example we introduced in Example 1. If the child member variable is typed as long (i.e., long child at line 4) and all the following operations regarding child are using type casting (i.e., doc->child=(long)body at line 13 and ((Elem*)doc->child)->getAlign() at line 21), then such a pointer propagation would not be traced. DANGNULL would under-trace object relationships in this case, and there would be false negatives if child becomes an unsafe dangling pointer.
False positives. To stop dereferencing on unsafe dangling pointers, DANGNULL nullifies not only unsafe dangling pointers but also benign dangling pointers. This implies DANGNULL additionally nullifies benign dangling pointers, and it is possible it may cause some false positives, although these should not have any semantic meaning as they are "dangled".
While testing DANGNULL for SPEC CPU benchmarks and the Chromium browser, we found one rare false positive case. This false positive case sporadically occurs when a new tab is manually created inside the Chromium browser, and it is related to the unique pointer hash table design (Example 4).
We believe this false positive example would not be a critical concern for deploying DANGNULL due to its rareness. As we described in the compatibility evaluation in §V-D, DANGNULL passed more than 30,000 stress tests with the Chromium browser, a large scale and highly complicated application.
VII. RELATED WORK
Memory-related issues, including invalid memory accesses, memory leaks, and use-after-free bugs, have been studied for many years. Numerous methods have been proposed for C/C++ 1 enum child_status {IN_USE=0, DELETED=1}; 2 hash_map <Element*, child_status, ptrHash> allChilds; programs. In this section, we categorize them and compare them with DANGNULL.
Use-after-free detectors. There is a line of research specifically focusing on detecting use-after-free vulnerabilities. In general, use-after-free vulnerabilities can be detected through both static and dynamic analysis. However, since 1) a dangling pointer itself is not erroneous behavior and 2) statically determining whether a dangling pointer will actually be used in the future requires precise points-to and reachability analyses across all possible inter-procedure paths, even state-of-the-art use-after-free detection tools based on the static analysis are only suitable for analyzing small programs [13, 34] .
For this reason, most use-after-free detectors [6, 30, 48] are based on the runtime dynamic analysis. CETS [30] maintains a unique identifier with each allocated object, associates this metadata with pointers, and checks that the object is still allocated on pointer dereferences. To handle pointer arithmetic, CETS uses taint propagation (i.e., the resulting pointer will inherit the metadata from the base pointer of the corresponding arithmetic operation). Unfortunately, the assumption behind this design choice -the propagated pointer should point to the same object-does not always hold, which results in high false positive rates. From our experiments, CETS raised false alarms on 5 out of 16 tested programs while DANGNULL was able to correctly run all 16 programs. In addition to high false positive rates, CETS relies on explicit checks to guarantee the memory access validity for all memory operations, thus imposing higher performance overhead in SPEC CPU2006 compared to DANGNULL. For 4 programs (bzip2, milc, sjeng, h264ref, and lbm) that CETS was able to run 7 , on average it incurred 40% slow down, while DANGNULL incurred 1% slow 7 CETS failed to compile 7 programs out of 16 SPEC CPU2006 programs we tested.
down.
Undangle [6] is another runtime dynamic analysis tool to detect use-after-free. It assigns each return value of memory allocation functions a unique label, and employs a dynamic taint analysis to track the propagation of these labels. On memory deallocation, Undangle checks which memory slots are still associated with the corresponding label, and then determines the unsafe dangling pointers based on the lifetime of dangling pointers (i.e., if the lifetime of a dangling pointer is higher than the certain threshold number, it is identified as an unsafe dangling pointer). While this approach can collect more complete pointer propagation information than DANGNULL (which would better help a bug triage or debugging process), a significant performance cost is required.
Control flow integrity. Control flow integrity (CFI) [1, [49] [50] [51] enforces indirect function calls to be legitimate (i.e., enforcing integrity of the control-flows). Similarly, SafeDispatch [22] prevents illegal control flows from virtual function call sites. Unlike use-after-free and memory error detectors, CFI makes useafter-free vulnerabilities difficult to exploit. Specifically, CFI only shepherds function pointers to guarantee legitimate control flows. In practice, however, most CFI implementations enforce coarse-grained CFI to avoid heavy performance overheads and false positive alarms, but recent research [7, 11, 15, 16] has demonstrated that all the aforementioned coarse-grained CFI implementations can be bypassed. Moreover, dangling pointers can also be abused to corrupt non-control data (e.g., vector length variables, user privilege bits, or sandbox enforcing flags) in objects [8] , all of which are not function pointers, which makes CFI based protection techniques bypassable. For example, a recent attack [27] overwrote user permission bits in the metadata to bypass user authorizations, including all other defense mechanisms. As an another example, vector length variable corruption is one popular technique to exploit use-afterfree vulnerabilities that lead to information leakage attacks or additional heap buffer overflows. DANGNULL eliminates dangling pointers at the moment they are created. Thus, it can protect not only control flows but also any other security sensitive metadata in the objects from being abused by use-after-free or double-free vulnerabilities.
Memory error detectors. Memcheck (Valgrind) [32] and Purify [19] are popular solutions for detecting memory errors. Since their main goal is to help debugging, they are designed to be complete (incurring no false negatives) and general (detecting all classes of memory problems) in identifying memory-leak vulnerabilities, imposing very high memory and CPU overheads.
AddressSanitizer [38] is another popular tool developed recently that optimizes the method of representing and probing the status of allocated memory. However, due to an assumption to support this optimization (a quarantine zone that prevents reuse of previously freed memory blocks), it cannot detect use-after-free bugs if the assumption does not hold (i.e., heap objects are reallocated). Specifically, attackers can easily leverage various techniques to force reallocation of previously freed memory blocks, such as Heap Spraying [10, 36] and Heap Fengshui [39] . To clearly demonstrate this issue, we developed a proof-of-concept exploit bypassing the detection of AddressSanitizer (Example 5). However, with DANGNULL, all Example 5: An example of exploits (Bug ID 162835) bypassing AddressSanitizer [38] . Lines with + marks show the bypassing routine, which keeps allocating the same sized memory to drain the quarantine zone of AddressSanitizer. Once the quarantine zone is drained, AddressSanitizer returns the previously freed memory block (i.e., an object is allocated in the previously freed memory region), which means it cannot identify memory semantic mismatches introduced by unsafe dangling pointers. Thus, AddressSanitizer cannot detect use-after-free exploits in this case, and this technique can be generalized to other use-after-free exploits with a different allocation size. However, DANGNULL detected this sophisticated exploit. dangling pointers will be nullified upon the deallocation of their objects, rendering use-after-free vulnerabilities unexploitable, even with sophisticated manipulations.
Safe memory allocators. Many safe memory allocators have been proposed to prevent dangling pointer issues. Cling [2] can disrupt a large class of exploits targeting use-after-free vulnerabilities by restricting memory reuse to objects of the same type. Diehard and Dieharder [4, 33] mitigate dangling pointer issues by approximating an infinite-sized heap.
Smart pointers. A smart pointer is an abstract data type that encapsulates a pointer to support automatic resource management. Theoretically, an application would not suffer from use-after-free issues if all the pointers are represented with smart pointers (i.e., no raw pointers are used in the application code). However, it is common to expose raw pointers even in applications heavily using smart pointers. For example, in order to break the resource graph cycle connected with shared pointers (e.g., std::shared_ptr in C++11), browser rendering engines including WebKit [45] and Blink [5] usually expose a raw pointer instead of using weak pointers (e.g., std::weak_ptr in C++11) to avoid extra performance overheads and be compatible with legacy code [26] , and these exposed raw pointers have been major use-after-free vulnerability sources for those engines.
Note that automatically wrapping raw pointers with smart pointers is another challenging static analysis problem, as this requires understanding precise raw pointer semantics to be properly implemented.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented DANGNULL, a system that detects temporal memory safety violations in runtime. We implemented DANGNULL, applied it to Chromium, and conducted a thorough evaluation showing the effectiveness and compatibility of DANGNULL. In particular, we demonstrated that DANGNULL can be applied to complex, large-scale software, such as the Chromium browser, to effectively mitigate use-after-free exploits with even the most sophisticated attack techniques. We believe DANGNULL can be used for a range of security applications: back-end use-after-free detection, runtime use-after-free mitigation, or use-after-free resilient programs.
